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WHO DECIDES CONSCIENCE? 
RFRA’S CATCH-22 
 




This Article examines application of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in cases challenging the contraception 
coverage rules under the Affordable Care Act.1 I will discuss a 
problem with the application of RFRA’s statutorily mandated 
strict scrutiny test in this context that has not received attention—
                                                          
* Director, Program for the Study of Reproductive Justice, Information 
Society Project, Yale Law School. Thanks to the speakers and panelists at the 
symposium, Religious Freedom and Equality: An International Look, held at 
Brooklyn Law School in 2013. Thanks to Brooklyn Law School, its Dean, 
faculty and staff for hosting the symposium, to those whose generous support 
for the conference made it possible, and to Louise Melling, who was the 
primary organizer of the event. For comments on previous versions of this 
essay that have greatly improved it, thanks are due to Jack Balkin and the ISP 
fellows, especially Andrew Tutt and Kara Loewentheil. For sharing their 
thoughts about religion and a commitment to social justice, thanks are due to 
Robert M. Pennoyer, Rev. John F. Smith, and James Carroll. Finally, I am 
also extremely grateful to David Giller and Florence Mao for their excellent 
editorial guidance and suggestions. 
1 Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 
2000bb-4 (2012). In City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), the 
Supreme Court held that the RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to state 
laws. It remains applicable to federal laws, like the Affordable Care Act.  See 
also, e.g., O’Bryan v. Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that RFRA is a valid exercise of congressional authority under the 
necessary and proper clause); Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1221 (9th 
Cir. 2002); Kikumura v. Hurley, 242 F.3d 950, 958 (10th Cir. 2001); 
Henderson v. Kennedy, 265 F.3d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Christians v. Crystal 
Evangelical Free Church, 141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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a problem I’ll call the RFRA Catch-22. The Court first 
confronted the identical Catch-22 in Employment Division v. 
Smith,2 a case I discuss in detail below, when it attempted to 
apply strict scrutiny to the constitutional free exercise claims of 
Native Americans whose ceremonial peyote use was proscribed 
by state law.3  On the one hand, the Court recognized that the 
First Amendment prohibits judicial review of the “centrality” of 
conduct to an individual’s religion, the “relative merits of 
differing religious claims,” or “the determin[ation] of the place of 
a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious 
claim.”4 On the other hand, “[d]ispensing with a ‘centrality’ 
inquiry is utterly unworkable,” said the Court.5 It would require 
courts to grant all claims, and to equate burdens on throwing rice 
at church weddings to burdens on getting married in church,6 or, 
more relevant to today’s cases, the “burden” of having one’s 
employees covered by insurance that includes coverage for 
contraception with the “burden” of being forced to use 
contraception oneself. Faced with this Catch-22, this choice 
between an all or nothing approach to free exercise claims 
seeking accommodation from generally applicable 
nondiscriminatory laws, in Smith the Court chose nothing, and 
rejected application of the strict scrutiny test to claims under the 
Free Exercise Clause. The Court wrote, “[t]he government’s 
ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially 
harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of 
                                                          
2 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
3 Id. The plaintiffs in Smith were denied unemployment compensation 
benefits for “misconduct” when they violated the state’s drug laws by using 
peyote. Id. 
4 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87 (“Nor is it possible to limit the impact of 
respondents’ proposal by requiring a ‘compelling state interest’ only when the 
conduct prohibited is ‘central’ to the individual’s religion. [A]s we reaffirmed 
only last Term, ‘[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of 
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ 
interpretations of those creeds.’” (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted)). 
5 Id. at 887 n.4.  
6 Id.  
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public policy, ‘cannot depend on measuring the effects of a 
governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual 
development.’”7 
Under RFRA, however, courts are again required to apply the 
strict scrutiny test in challenges to federal government conduct 
claimed to burden “religious exercise,”8 requiring precisely the 
sort of judicial measurement of religious tenets and impact on 
spiritual matters that the Smith Court recognized are precluded by 
the Establishment Clause.9 Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court 
will have to grapple with this familiar Catch-22 as it considers the 
expansive interpretations of “religious exercise” and “substantial 
burden” under RFRA promoted by the plaintiffs in Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius10 and Sebelius v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores,11 challenges to the contraceptive coverage rules 
being heard by the Court this term. As Georgetown Law 
Professor Marty Lederman’s detailed writings revealing the 
                                                          
7 Id. at 885 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2012). 
9 See infra Part II; Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (equating evaluation of 
centrality with, inter alia, substantiality, discussing “unacceptable ‘business of 
evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims,’” and citing Justice 
Stevens’ warning in United States v. Lee that this type of judicial evaluation of 
religious tenets would create “the risk that governmental approval of some and 
disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring one religion over another” 
(citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring))); id. at 889 n.5, 887 n.4. See also Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking 
the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice 
and Belief, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 85, 122–23 (1997) (noting that RFRA’s 
substantial burden test “appear[s] to require courts to engage in the kind of 
investigation into religious beliefs that Supreme Court Justices have 
increasingly and nearly uniformly rejected”).  
10 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Conestoga Wood Specialities 
Corp. v. Sebelius, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/ 
cases/conestoga-wood-specialties-corp-v-sebelius/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) 
(list of briefs filed for this case). 
11 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ 
sebelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (list of briefs 
filed for this case). 
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minimal burden on Hobby Lobby Executives’ religious exercise 
establish,12 in order to find for Hobby Lobby the Court would 
have to adopt a broad hands-off view of RFRA’s protections. 
Under this view, it is the RFRA claimant, not the court, who 
decides if something is a “substantial burden” on “religious 
exercise” under RFRA. This broad interpretation was articulated 
clearly by counsel for the University of Notre Dame in a recent 
oral argument in a related case in the Seventh Circuit in which 
counsel stated that it is enough if Notre Dame believes something 
is a “substantial burden” under RFRA. As counsel argued, “[i]t 
is up to the believer to draw the line.”13 
I won’t hide my views of these broad claims. Better to 
confess them now. If the Court upholds the plaintiffs’ RFRA 
claims and the broad hands-off interpretation of “religious 
exercise” and “substantial burden” they necessitate, rather than 
finding a way to limit RFRA’s scope constitutionally to deny 
accommodations in these cases,14 RFRA will have no 
boundaries.15 A broad RFRA, read as the Court must read it—and 
to read it fairly and in accordance with the Establishment 
Clause—will mean a vastly different society, but that’s not 
necessarily a bad thing. If I were confident that the courts would 
                                                          
12 See infra note 22. 
13 See, e.g., Oral Argument at 27:23, Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 
(7th Cir. argued Feb. 12, 2014) (No. 13-3853), available at 
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2014/rs.13-3853.13-3853_02_12_2014. 
mp3 [hereinafter Notre Dame Oral Argument]. This case involves the even 
more fantastical claim that even invoking a statutorily-granted accommodation 
from the contraceptive coverage requirements for non-profit religious 
institutions, who self-certify, was a “substantial burden.” See infra notes 109–
10 and accompanying text. 
14 I discuss possible narrowing techniques below. See infra Part III.   
15 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888–89 (“The rule respondents favor would open 
the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic 
obligations of almost every conceivable kind-ranging from compulsory military 
service, . . . to the payment of taxes, . . . [to] manslaughter and child neglect 
laws, . . . compulsory vaccination laws . . . drug laws, [to] environmental 
protection laws, . . . and laws providing for equality of opportunity for the 
races.”). 
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in fact review RFRA claims equitably, showing equal respect to 
all claims of religious exercise, I could allow myself to see a 
silver lining in a dark cloud—one that could be brought to bear in 
challenges to numerous federal laws under the aegis of federal 
RFRA. The broad interpretation of “religious exercise” and 
“substantial burden” being promoted in these cases could even be 
persuasive in challenges brought under state versions of RFRA 
that prohibit state restrictions that “substantially burden” 
“religious exercise.” Defined as broadly as the plaintiffs in these 
contraceptive coverage challenges advocate, requiring a hands-off 
judicial approach to evaluating burdens, RFRA’s protections 
could mean a new birth of freedom—freedom from draconian 
limits on reproductive choice, limits on sexual expression, limits 
on drug possession and drug use, requirements of service on 
juries, requirements that certain taxes be paid and census 
questions answered, and limitations on who and how many one 
may marry.  
Unfortunately, though, I am not confident of the courts’ 
ability to apply a broad RFRA fairly. In rejecting strict scrutiny 
in Smith, the Court admitted that it cannot apply the unbounded 
strict scrutiny test equitably or in a manner in accordance with the 
Establishment Clause. Dueling opinions of two panels of the 
Seventh Circuit—one insisting on judicial evaluation of the 
“substantiality” of burden and the other limiting review of 
“substantiality” drastically—confirm this view.16  
By reimposing the strict scrutiny test rejected in Smith, 
Congress has put the Court into the same untenable position it 
faced in Smith. The Court can choose “nothing” again, insisting 
that conducting these determinations is beyond the “judicial ken.” 
                                                          
16 The Notre Dame panel rejected the broad hands-off view, but another 
panel of the Seventh Circuit appears to endorse it. Compare Notre Dame v. 
Sebelius, No. 13-3853, slip op. at 21 (7th Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (noting that 
“substantiality . . . is for the court to decide”), with Korte v. Sebelius, 735 
F.3d 654, 683 (7th Cir. 2013) (noting that “substantial burden inquiry” must 
be limited to the evaluation of  “the coercive effect of the government 
pressure” to act against beliefs). See also infra notes 109–19 and 
accompanying text. 
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It could choose “all,” deferring to the plaintiffs’ characterization 
of religious “exercise” and the “substantiality” of burden, as 
Notre Dame’s counsel urged. Or it could, as I expect it to, claim 
to be evaluating the substantiality of the burden in this case but in 
practice conduct no real evaluation at all, ignoring its earlier 
warnings about the discriminatory results that have occurred 
under this standard and are likely to occur again in the future.  
Thus, the most likely result is a broad and protective RFRA for 
some, those with religious exercise claims with which judges are 
most familiar, and a weak RFRA for the rest of us. 
In Part I below, I will outline the relevant RFRA standards 
and ACA requirements, and briefly discuss arguments made by 
others that RFRA violates the Establishment Clause on its face, 
or alternatively, that RFRA would be unconstitutional “as 
applied” if applied to grant accommodations in Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Wood.  In Part II, I will discuss judicial review of free 
exercise claims, explain the Catch-22 the Court faced in 
Employment Division v. Smith, how RFRA creates the same 
Catch-22, and how the breadth of the claims in Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Wood traps the Court in the Catch-22.  Finally, in 
Part III, I will suggest two ways for the Court to limit RFRA and 
avoid the Catch-22 at least in these cases, and then close with a 
discussion of the ramifications of granting accommodations in 
these cases, either by granting all accommodations requested 
under RFRA or by conducting only a perfunctory examination of 
“substantial burden.” 
 
I. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT AND THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
 
The question of how to balance competing claims of religious 
conscience and equality mandates imposed by secular authority is 
currently being played out most prominently in the ongoing battle 
over the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).17 The ACA requires 
                                                          
17 Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, amended by 
Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 [hereinafter ACA]. See also Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
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employers with fifty or more employees, who are not otherwise 
exempt from the Act’s requirements,18 to provide their employees 
with a minimum level of health insurance or pay an assessment to 
the Internal Revenue Service.19 Nonexempt group plans must 
provide coverage without cost-sharing for preventive care and 
screening for women20 that includes “[a]ll Food and Drug 
Administration approved contraceptive methods, sterilization 
procedures, and patient education and counseling for women with 
reproductive capacity.”21  Notably, employers do not have to pay 
for contraception themselves because contraception is a cost-
saving preventive service and is therefore routinely offered at no 
additional cost. Moreover, as Professor Lederman has explained 
in detail, although this provision of the law has been widely 
described as a contraception “mandate,” this term is a misnomer, 
both because of the numerous accommodations and exemptions 
from the requirements granted by statute and regulation to 
religious institutions and nonprofit organizations, and because the 
statute also provides objectors with a way to avoid the 
contraception coverage requirements altogether.22 If these entities 
                                                          
724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013) (“ACA requires non-exempt group plans to 
provide coverage without cost-sharing for preventative care and screening for 
women in accordance with guidelines created by the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (‘HRSA’), a sub-agency of HHS.”). 
18 The ACA provides broad exemptions for religious institutions and 
nonprofit organizations who self-certify that they oppose providing 
contraception.  In such circumstances, health plans will provide the coverage 
without the involvement of the employer.  See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 147.131 
(2012).   
19 Conestoga Wood, 724 F.3d at 381. 
20 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13(a)(4) (2012)). 
21 Id. (quoting 77 C.F.R. 8725 (2012)). 
22 Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III: There Is No “Employer 
Mandate,” BALKINIZATION (Dec. 16, 2013, 9:36 AM),  
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-iiitheres-no-
employer.html [hereinafter Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III] (citing 26 
U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2012), which provides that a large employer must make 
an “assessable payment” to the IRS if it chooses not to offer its full-time 
employees participation in an employer-sponsored health insurance plan); 
Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III-A: Does Federal Law Substantially 
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object to providing the health insurance package outlined in the 
Affordable Care Act, they can choose not to provide health 
insurance and instead pay an assessment to the IRS.23  
Despite this alternative, numerous cases have been filed 
throughout the country challenging the requirement in different 
postures.24 In March 2014, the Court heard arguments in two of 
those cases, Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores,25 and Conestoga 
Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius,26 both of which involve 
objections of for-profit businesses to the contraceptive coverage 
requirement of the ACA. In Hobby Lobby, the plaintiff is a for-
profit corporation that claims the contraceptive coverage 
requirements violate the corporation’s right to religious exercise 
                                                          
Pressure Employers to Offer Health Insurance Coverage in Violation of 
Religious Obligations, Even Though There is No “Employer Mandate”?, 
BALKINIZATION (Dec. 28, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-iii-adoes-federal-law.html [hereinafter Lederman, 
Hobby Lobby Part III-A]. See also, e.g., Marty Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part 
I – Framing the Issues, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 11, 2013, 10:28 PM),  
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-part-i-framing-issues.html 
[hereinafter Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part I];  Marty Lederman, Not Quite 
Hobby Lobby: The Nonprofit Cases, and Opting Out as Complicity, 
BALKINIZATION (Jan. 1, 2014, 5:24 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/01/ 
not-quite-hobby-lobby-nonprofit-cases.html [hereinafter Lederman, Not Quite 
Hobby Lobby] (explaining cases involving plaintiffs who object to the 
procedures for making use of the exemptions granted to nonprofit 
organizations). 
23 For a full description of the alternative to providing a plan with the 
required services and its implications, see Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III-A, 
supra note 22. 
24 For updates on these cases, see Challenges to the Federal Contraceptive 
Coverage Rule, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/reproductivefreedom/challenges 
-federal-contraceptive-coverage-rule (last updated Mar. 13, 2014). 
25 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013); see also Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ 
sebelius-v-hobby-lobby-stores-inc/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) (list of briefs 
filed for this case). 
26 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013); see also Conestoga Wood Specialities 
Corp. v. Sebelius, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/ 
cases/conestoga-wood-specialties-corp-v-sebelius/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014) 
(list of briefs filed for this case). 
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under RFRA because of the religious objections of the 
corporation’s owners.27 In Conestoga Wood, the Plaintiffs include 
the individual “religious owners” of the “family business” as well 
as the for-profit corporation itself. They assert the claims of the 
individuals and the for-profit corporation under both RFRA,28 as 
well as the Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause.29   
It is extremely unlikely that the Court will consider the free 
exercise claim in Conestoga Wood because the standard 
applicable to constitutional free exercise claims is lower than the 
RFRA standard.30 This means that if the plaintiffs prevail on their 
RFRA claims, there will be no need to look to the constitutional 
claim; and if the plaintiffs lose their RFRA claim under an 
application of RFRA’s strict scrutiny standard, it is “virtually 
inconceivable” that they’d win under the less stringent Free 
Exercise Clause claim, or even under a Free Exercise Clause 
reinterpreted to require application of strict scrutiny.31 Therefore, 
assuming the Court disregards, as have the lower courts,32 the 
plaintiffs’ option to avoid the requirement to provide health 
insurance that includes contraception by declining to offer any 
health insurance at all, the Court will be faced with difficult 
questions about how to evaluate the claims of conscience in these 
cases. While much has been written about RFRA generally33 and 
                                                          
27 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013). 
28 42 U.S. C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2012).   
29 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 
724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013). 
30 In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court 
rejected the strict scrutiny standard of review for reasons discussed more fully 
below.  See infra notes 37–40 and accompanying text. 
31 See, e.g., Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part I, supra note 22 (predicting 
that “the constitutional question, as such, will consume only a tiny fraction of 
the total briefing, and virtually none of the Court’s attention.”). 
32 See Lederman, Hobby Lobby Part III, supra note 22. 
33 See, e.g., Caroline M. Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1469 (2013) (contraception coverage requirement does not violate 
Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause or the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act);  Caroline M. Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty  
(Jan. 24, 2014) (manuscript at 3 n.22), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
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the contraceptive mandate challenges in particular,34 one issue 
                                                          
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2384963 [hereinafter Corbin, Corporate 
Religious Liberty] (citing numerous articles discussing whether corporations 
are protected under RFRA); Caroline M. Corbin & Steven D. Smith, Debate: 
The Contraception Mandate and Religious Freedom, 161 U. PENN L. REV. 
ONLINE (June 14, 2013), http://www.pennlawreview.com/debates/ 
index.php?id=48 [hereinafter Corbin & Smith, Debate] (debating status of 
contraceptive coverage requirement under RFRA and arguing that corporations 
are not eligible “persons” under RFRA); Christopher L. Eisgruber & 
Lawrence G. Sager, Protecting Without Favoring Religiously Motivated 
Conduct, 2 NEXUS J. OP. 103 (1997) [hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, 
Protecting Without Favoring]; Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. 
Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, 69 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 437 (1994) [hereinafter Eisgruber & Sager, Why RFRA is 
Unconstitutional]; Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA 
Exemptions From the Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional 
Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014); Marci A. Hamilton, Employment Division v. Smith at the Supreme 
Court: The Justices, The Litigants, and the Doctrinal Discourse, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1671 (2011) [hereinafter Hamilton, Smith at the Supreme Court]; 
Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is 
Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 3 (1998) [hereinafter 
Hamilton, Religious Freedom Restoration Act]; Kara Loewentheil, When Free 
Exercise Is a Burden: Protecting “Third Parties” in Religious Accommodation 
Law, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 433 (2014). 
34 I will not discuss here, but will refer the interested reader to, excellent 
literature analyzing claims that the contraceptive coverage requirements violate 
the Free Exercise Clause, the Free Speech Clause, or RFRA under current 
doctrine.  For example, Caroline Corbin has written a series of articles 
outlining many flaws in the arguments of those who claim their free exercise 
rights are violated by the contraceptive coverage requirements. See, e.g., 
Caroline M. Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1469 
(2013) (contraception coverage requirement does not violate Free Exercise 
Clause, the Free Speech Clause, or the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); 
id. at 1477 (citing Zelman v. Simmon-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) 
(availability of federal funds to religious schools through voucher programs 
was too indirect to create Establishment Clause problem)) (pointing out that 
any “burden” of providing health insurance that includes coverage for 
contraception is not “substantial” because it is so “indirect”); Corbin & Smith, 
Debate, supra note 33 (debating status of contraceptive coverage requirement 
under RFRA and arguing that corporations are not eligible “persons” under 
RFRA). For the argument that for-profit corporations are not “persons” under 
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that has not received attention is the impact that the Court’s 
analysis in Smith35 should have on its method of review of the 
contraceptive coverage challenges brought under RFRA and the 
potential Catch-22 that the RFRA revives. 
 
A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Response to 
Employment Division v. Smith 
 
RFRA was enacted in 1993 with broad bipartisan support in 
response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith.36 In Smith, the Court held that the Free 
Exercise Clause did not prohibit application of Oregon drug laws 
to the use of peyote during the religious ceremony of Native 
Americans and, therefore, the state could deny claimants 
unemployment compensation for work-related “misconduct” 
based on their use of the drug. In rejecting the free exercise 
claims of the Native Americans, the Court also rejected the strict 
scrutiny standard it had previously claimed was applicable to free 
exercise claims,37 writing: 
To make an individual’s obligation to obey such a 
law contingent upon the law’s coincidence with his 
religious beliefs, except where the State’s interest 
                                                          
RFRA, see generally Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty, supra note 33 
(citing articles on the subject).  
35 494 U.S. 872 (1990). But see Levine, supra note 9, at 122–23 (noting 
that RFRA’s substantial burden test “appear[s] to require courts to engage in 
the kind of investigation into religious beliefs that Supreme Court Justices have 
increasingly and nearly uniformly rejected”). 
36 494 U.S. 872 (1990). For a description of the bipartisan movement to 
enact RFRA as a response to Smith, see, for example, Eisgruber & Sager, 
Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33, at 438–41. 
37 In Eisgruber & Sager, Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33, 
at 446–47, the authors argue that in rejecting the strict scrutiny standard, Smith 
was actually just bringing doctrine in line with past results. While in other 
constitutional areas the compelling state interest test has been “‘strict’ in theory 
and fatal in fact,” in the pre-Smith religious exemption cases, they point out 
that the test was “strict in theory but feeble in fact.” Id. (noting the Court had 
only applied the test to mandate accommodations from generally applicable 
laws in the unemployment compensation cases and Yoder).   
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is “compelling”—permitting him, by virtue of his 
beliefs, “to become a law unto himself”—
contradicts both constitutional tradition and 
common sense.38 
As a result, the Court held that “if prohibiting the exercise of 
religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of 
the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable 
and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been 
offended.”39   
Reflecting a concern that the decision in Smith put religious 
exercise at risk, Congress enacted RFRA and reinstituted the 
strict scrutiny standard.40 RFRA requires that “[g]overnment shall 
not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless “it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is 
in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is 
the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”41 But while some who supported RFRA 
may have been motivated by a reaction to the Court’s 
inconsistency in and seemingly discriminatory pattern with which 
the Court had applied the Free Exercise doctrine generally—and 
by the rejection of a “minority” religious claim in Smith in 
particular—enactment of RFRA simply reimposed the standard 
the courts had applied inconsistently in the past.42 Moreover, 
                                                          
38 Smith, 494 U.S. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 167 (1878)). 
39 Id. at 878. 
40 Eisgruber & Sager, Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33, at 
438 (describing “self-congratulatory hoopla” from both sides of the aisle that 
accompanied enactment of RFRA). 
41 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (emphasis added). 
42 Compare Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (granting an 
accommodation from compulsory school-attendance laws to Amish parents 
who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school and 
discussing the Amish’s generally civilized behavior); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963) (granting Seventh Day Adventist an exemption from laws 
requiring her to make herself available to work on a Saturday), with Dep’t of 
Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (rejecting application of the 
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RFRA did nothing to solve the Catch-22 at the heart of the 
jurisprudence that led the Court to walk away from the strict 
scrutiny standard in Smith.  
 
B. RFRA—Unconstitutional on its Face?  
 
Law Professors Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager43 
have argued that RFRA is unconstitutional on its face because it 
improperly privileges religion in violation of the Establishment 
Clause.44 This argument has been presented to the Court in an 
amicus brief filed on behalf of the Freedom from Religion 
Foundation and others.45 Justice Stevens adopted this view in his 
concurrence in City of Boerne v. Flores,46 where he argued that 
RFRA required granting an exemption from a generally 
applicable neutral civil law to religious practice, something that 
no atheist or agnostic could obtain, thus establishing a 
governmental preference for religion that is forbidden by the First 
                                                          
Sherbert test to peyote ban that prevented Native Americans from performing a 
religious ritual that was widely acknowledged to be central to their religious 
practice); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (sustaining, 
without mentioning the Sherbert test, a prison’s refusal to excuse Muslim 
inmates from work requirements to attend worship services); Goldman v. 
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting application of the Sherbert test to 
military dress regulations that forbade the wearing of yarmulkes). 
43 Professor Eisgruber was a Professor of Law at NYU Law School, and 
is currently the President of Princeton University. News at Princeton, 
PRINCETON UNIV. (Apr. 21, 2013), http://www.princeton.edu/main/ 
news/archive/S36/65/54C75/index.xml?section=featured. Lawrence Sager is 
Professor of Law at University of Texas School of Law.  See UT Law Faculty 
– Lawrence Sager, UT LAW, http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/sagerl/ (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2014). 
44 See Eisgruber & Sager, Protecting Without Favoring, supra note 33; 
Eisgruber & Sager, Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33. 
45 Brief of the Freedom for Religion Foundation et al., Sebelius v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., No. 13-354 (U.S. Jan. 27, 2014), available at 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Hamilton-brief-
Hobby-Lobby.pdf. 
46 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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Amendment.47 Other than Justice Stevens though, no other Justice 
was persuaded by the argument, or even commented on it, in 
Boerne. Moreover, in Cutter v. Wilkinson,48 the Court explicitly 
rejected a facial Establishment Clause challenge to a law quite 
similar to RFRA, section 3 of the Religious Land Use and 
Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”). That statute 
mandates application of the RFRA strict scrutiny standard to 
patients or inmates confined to a federal institution.49  In Cutter, 
state officials mounted a facial challenge to RLUIPA under the 
Establishment Clause after prisoners who were members of 
nontraditional religions claimed that their rights were violated 
under the Act. The Court held that while “[a]t some point, 
accommodation may devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of 
religion,’”50 section 3 of RLUIPA did not cross this line.51   
There are certainly ways to distinguish Cutter and the 
                                                          
47 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–55 (1985)). 
48  544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
49  Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (providing in part: 
“[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of 
a person residing in or confined to an institution,” unless the burden furthers 
“a compelling governmental interest” and does so by “the least restrictive 
means”) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 (providing “(a) [g]overnment shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden results 
from a rule of general applicability [unless] . . . (b) . . . it demonstrates that 
application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest”). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (preventing 
implementation of land use regulation in a manner that “imposes a substantial 
burden on . . . religious exercise,” unless the government demonstrates that 
the burden “is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest” and “is 
the least restrictive means” of furthering that interest). 
50 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 714 (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334–35 (1987)). 
51 Id. The Sixth Circuit had agreed with the state officials, holding that 
RLUIPA violated the Establishment Clause on its face because it 
“impermissibly advances religion by giving greater protection to religious 
rights than to other constitutionally protected rights . . . .” Id. at 709 
(discussing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003)). 
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RLUIPA from RFRA that could support a holding that RFRA 
violates the Establishment Clause in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga 
Wood, despite Cutter. First, and most obviously, RLUIPA is 
much “less sweeping” than RFRA. It targets two specific areas, 
land-use regulation and religious exercise by institutionalized 
persons, while RFRA is a seemingly unlimited mandate to 
privilege religious exercise over nonreligious conduct, and in 
Cutter, the Court emphasizes RLUIPA’s targeted nature.52 The 
Court made much of Congress’s extensive documentation in 
hearings spanning three years of the specific problems of 
institutionalized persons and the “frivolous or arbitrary,” 
“egregious and unnecessary” barriers to their religious exercise 
that they faced that could limit its holding to the narrow situation 
of institutionalized persons.53  
Second, the Cutter decision is quite narrow in other ways.  
The Court has recognized that the Free Exercise Clause “requires 
governmental respect for, and noninterference with, the religious 
beliefs and practices of our Nation’s people.”54 In upholding 
                                                          
52 Id. at 715, 720–21 (“Section 3 covers state-run institutions—mental 
hospitals, prisons, and the like . . . .”); see also id. at 722 (citing appropriate 
accommodation of religion in military context where it did not interfere with 
“military duties”). 
53 Id. at 716 (noting that “[b]efore enacting [section] 3, Congress 
documented, in hearings spanning three years, that . . . ‘some institutions 
restrict religious liberty in egregious and unnecessary ways’”) (quoting 146 
Cong. Rec. 16698, 16699 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch and Sen. 
Edward M. Kennedy on RLUIPA)). 
54 Id. at 719. See also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & 
Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S.Ct. 694, 706 (2012) (noting that the First Amendment 
“gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations”). While some 
saw the Court’s recent decision in Hosanna—agreeing with Lutheran Church 
that application of employment discrimination statutes to its choice of 
“minister” violated the First Amendment and approving the judicially created 
“ministerial” exemption from state and federal employment discrimination 
prohibitions for religious institutions—as a sign of the Court’s deference to 
religion claims, the case is quite limited in ways that diminish its precedential 
value as a skipper guiding our course here.  
 First, the Court acknowledges in Hosanna-Tabor the special status of the 
“ministerial exception” granted to religious institutions in constitutional law, 
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RLUIPA, though, the Court treads carefully, navigating a narrow 
path between the “conflicting pressures” of the Free Exercise and 
the Establishment Clauses.55 As the Court explained in Hosanna 
Tabor, the Religion Clauses must be interpreted in concert to 
both protect against government action that promotes the 
majority’s favored brand of religion (Establishment Clause) and 
government action that impedes religious practices not favored by 
the majority (Free Exercise Clause).56 On the one hand, if 
legislatures and judges were precluded by the Establishment 
Clause from adopting or granting, respectively, exemptions from 
                                                          
and that the exception survived Smith as a self-contained, rarely invoked, 
narrow exception, much like Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792–94 
(1983) (finding that “the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer 
has become part of the fabric of our society,” and holding that selection of a 
Presbyterian minister for 16 years who is paid from the public fisc and whose 
prayers are only in the Judeo-Christian tradition, does not in itself conflict with 
the Establishment Clause, absent proof that his reappointment stemmed from 
an impermissible motive). Moreover, in Hosanna-Tabor, rather than exerting 
competing pressures—the Free Exercise Clause pressing proaccommodation 
and the Establishment Clause pressing antiaccommodation—both clauses 
pressed towards accommodation.   
 While recognizing that the ADA’s prohibition on retaliation was a valid 
and neutral law of general applicability like the prohibition on peyote use at 
issue in Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, the Court distinguished the two 
cases, noting that a “church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s 
ingestion of peyote.” Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 707. Regulation of 
“physical acts,” like the use of drugs, is unlike review of selection of ministers 
which would have involved “government interference with an internal church 
decision that affects the faith and the mission of the church itself,” which is an 
Establishment Clause no-no akin to “‘lend[ing Government] power to one or 
the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma.’” Id. at 707 
(quoting Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)). 
55 Id. at 719–20 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. at 890; Corp. of Presiding Bishop 
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329–30 
(1987) (approving federal exemption for religious organizations from Title 
VII’s prohibition on religious discrimination)) (noting that the Religion Clauses 
are “cast in absolute terms,” and “if expanded to a logical extreme, would 
tend to clash with each other”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n of N.Y.C., 397 U.S. 
664, 668–69 (1970)). 
56 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 730. 
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generally applicable laws at least in some circumstances, then 
much of the protection the Free Exercise Clause is designed to 
provide—the “special solicitude” to religious practice it 
endorses57—could be nullified by generally applicable laws that 
proscribe religious practices. The danger to religious exercise 
rights would be particularly acute in the institutions whose 
inhabitants RLUIPA was designed to protect. In those contexts, 
“government exerts a degree of control unparalleled in civilian 
society and severely disabling to private religious exercise.”58 On 
the other hand, this ability to grant accommodations in honor of 
the Free Exercise guarantees has never been, nor should it be, 
unlimited, lest the accommodations tilt too far into Establishment 
Clause territory.59 
In Cutter, the Court stressed three important aspects of 
RLUIPA that established it, at least in a facial challenge, as a 
permissive legislative accommodation that fits between the Scylla 
and Charybdis60 of the Religion Clauses, demonstrating solicitude 
                                                          
57 See id. at 706 (noting that the First Amendment “gives special 
solicitude to the rights of religious organizations”). Surely, though privileging 
of individual religions or the privileging of religion over non-religion is not 
allowed, some solicitude to religious exercise is required. Smith, 494 U.S. at 
890 (“[A] society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious 
belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation . . . .”).   
58  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S.Ct. at 720–21. 
59 Even proaccommodationist Michael McConnell argues for “rigorous 
limitations” on accommodations. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of 
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
685, 687–88 (1992) (“[A]ccommodations are . . . sometimes required and, 
within rigorous limitations . . . are always permitted. That does not mean, of 
course, that every benefit to religion masquerading as an accommodation is 
constitutional, but it does mean that the principle of accommodation, when 
properly applied, is consistent with the requirements of the Religion Clauses.” 
(emphasis added)).  
60 In Greek mythology, Scylla and Charybdis were two monsters living on 
either side of the waterway between Italy and Sicily. Scylla was a six-headed 
beast who was said to eat ships and their sailors, while Charybdis was a 
whirlpool who would suck the boats and men down into  
her watery abyss. Scylla and Charybdis, MYTH ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www. 
mythencyclopedia.com/Sa-Sp/Scylla-and-Charybdis.html. Ships rarely made it 
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to religious exercise, an appropriate protection of religious 
freedom, rather than an inappropriate privileging of religion. 
First, to be permissive, an accommodation must “alleviate[] 
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious 
exercise.”61 A legislative act that protects religious expression by 
removing government-imposed burdens rather than creating 
privilege where no burden existed is more likely to be perceived 
as “an accommodation of the exercise of religion rather than as a 
Government endorsement of religion.”62 As a response to burdens 
imposed in government-run institutions, RLUIPA met this part of 
the test.   
Second, courts must be satisfied that the permissive 
accommodation will be “administered neutrally among different 
faiths.”63 Noting there was no reason on the face of RLUIPA to 
believe that it would not be applied neutrally, the Court found 
this second aspect of the test satisfied.64 Third, in evaluating 
accommodations, the Court noted that courts “must take adequate 
account of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose 
on non-beneficiaries,” and, in granting an accommodation, courts 
must not “override other significant interests.”65 The Court held 
that RLUIPA must be applied so as not to elevate accommodation 
of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain 
order and safety, and so found this third aspect of the permissive 
accommodation test satisfied as well.   
RFRA is expected to survive on its face, not least because the 
government has not pressed a facial challenge.66  It is, after all, a 
                                                          
between the two unscathed.  Id.   
61 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720. 
62 Id. (quoting Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 349 (1987)). 
63 Id. (citing Bd. of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet,  
512 U.S. 687, 705 (1994)) (statute that created special school district for one 
religious enclave and excluded all others violated the Establishment Clause).   
64 Cf. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S at 705.  
65 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720. For further discussion of “significant 
interests” that must be considered, see Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 33.  
66 See, e.g., id. (arguing that “it is likely that RFRA facially complies 
with the Establishment Clause”). But see Hamilton, Religious Freedom 
2014.05.06 SMITH.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:26 AM 
 WHO DECIDES CONSCIENCE? RFRA’S CATCH-22 745 
 
legislative accommodation that allows plaintiffs of all religions to 
seek relief from a government imposed burden, and thus seems to 
meet the first, and perhaps the second, part of the test that the 
Court lays out in Cutter. However, the third criterion should 
create problems when analyzing whether RFRA is constitutional 
as applied to the case of contraceptive coverage requirements as 
discussed next. 
 
C.  RFRA—Unconstitutional As Applied to For-Profit 
Employers Seeking an Accommodation from the 
Contraceptive Coverage Requirements 
 
Applying RFRA to grant accommodations from the 
contraceptive coverage requirements to for-profit employers, as 
requested in the two cases before the Court, is constitutionally 
problematic because it would not “take adequate account of the 
burdens a requested accommodation may impose on non-
beneficiaries,” and thus would “override other significant 
interests”67 in violation of the Court’s limitations on permissive 
accommodations set out in Cutter. Professors Gedicks and Van 
Tassell argue that Establishment Clause doctrine prohibits 
“accommodations that shift the costs of an accommodated 
religion from those who practice it to those who don’t.”68 As they 
note,  
employees who do not share their employer’s 
                                                          
Restoration Act, supra note 33. 
67 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720.   
68 See Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 33. Professors Gedicks and Van 
Tassel argue, “Neither courts nor commentators seem aware that a line of 
permissive-accommodation prohibits shifting of material costs of 
accommodating anticontraception beliefs from the employers who hold them to 
the employees who do not. The impermissibility of cost-shifting under the 
Establishment Clause is a threshold doctrine whose application is logically 
prior to all of the RFRA issues on which the courts are now focused.” Id. This 
argument is before the Court in the form of an amicus brief. See Brief for 
Amici Curiae Church-State Scholars Frederick Mark Gedicks et al., Sebelius 
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., Nos. 13-354 and 13-356, 2014 WL 333891 
(U.S. Jan. 27, 2014). 
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anticontraception beliefs would be denied their 
statutory and regulatory entitlement to 
contraception coverage without cost sharing, and 
thus would be directly saddled with material costs 
they would not incur in the absence of the 
exemption. Employees and their families would be 
deprived of the benefits of the Mandate to which 
they are otherwise legally entitled. The RFRA 
exemption would require that they pay the out-of-
pocket expense of contraceptives and related 
services that they ought to receive at no expense 
beyond their monthly health care insurance 
premium.  This is a direct burden that would not 
exist without the permissive accommodation of 
RFRA exemption.69 
Applying RFRA to grant exemptions from the mandate in the 
cases before the Supreme Court, the authors argue, would exceed 
the Establishment Clause’s “limits on permissive 
accommodation.”70  Drawing from current doctrine, Gedicks and 
Van Tassell suggest a limitation on the right to free exercise that 
ends where the rights of nonadherents begin.  
Kara Loewentheil takes this argument one step further.71 Like 
Gedicks and Van Tassell, she focuses on Cutter’s third limitation, 
the requirement that the courts consider the impact of 
accommodations on third parties. She argues that the current 
doctrine applicable to religious accommodation claims, under 
                                                          
69  Gedicks & Van Tassel, supra note 33, at 47–48 (noting that “[t]he 
externalized cost will be material for most employees. Effective oral 
contraceptive drugs cost between $180 and $960 per year, depending on the 
drug prescribed and the area of the country where the prescription is filled”). 
70 Id. Yet, another “as-applied” Establishment Clause problem would 
arise if the RFRA was not “administered neutrally among different faiths.” See 
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720. For example, if courts granted accommodations 
under the RFRA for one religion, like Christian practices for example, but for 
few or no others, one could argue that this mosaic of accommodations added 
up to a preference for Christianity over other religions in violation of the 
Establishment Clause. See id.  
71 See Loewentheil, supra note 33. 
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both the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, is ill-suited to cases—like the contraceptive coverage 
requirement cases—in which the “primary conflict lies between 
different sets of non-state rights-holders: specifically religious 
objectors and existing rights-holders whose interests or rights 
would be negatively impacted (or completely blocked) by a grant 
of religious accommodation to an objector, particularly when 
such [existing rights-holders] have equality-implicating rights at 
stake.”72 For these cases, Loewentheil argues, a framework is 
needed that would “vindicate[e] the purpose of religious 
accommodation rights [while also] protecting [existing rights-
holders] from the negative impact of accommodations.”73 While 
Loewentheil argues that “current doctrine can be argued to 
obliquely support an emphasis on the[] interests” of existing 
rights holders, she also proposes “a framework that places a 
positive obligation on the state to respect all the substantial rights 
involved when possible—and that prioritizes equality-implicating 
rights when not possible.”74 If the Supreme Court is brave enough 
in the Conestoga Wood and Hobby Lobby cases to deny the 
exemptions, an unlikely but vaguely possible outcome,75 the 
                                                          
72 Id. at 501. 
73 Id.   
74 Id. 
75 If the Court’s recent action in Little Sisters of the Poor is any 
indication, the Court is intent on avoiding any serious examination of these 
issues.  Little Sisters of the Poor Home for the Aged v. Sebelius, No. 13A691, 
2014 WL 272207 (U.S. Jan. 24, 2014). In Little Sisters of the Poor, the 
plaintiffs were eligible for a statutory exemption from the contraceptive 
coverage requirement. Nonetheless, they filed suit against the requirement and 
refused to comply with the administrative procedures created to notify the 
government and the insurance companies that they were eligible for the 
exemption, complaining that doing so would enable the insurance companies to 
provide the coverage on its own, thus making Little Sisters complicit in 
someone else’s sin. The Court simply created a different administrative 
mechanism that required the plaintiffs to inform the government in writing that 
they qualified for the exemption, relieved them of the responsibility of filling 
out the government form, and required the government to inform the insurance 
company on behalf of the objectors. Filling out the government form and 
sending that form to the insurance companies was apparently a “substantial 
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Court is most likely to deny them based on the harm to third 
party interests under either the Gedicks/Van Tassell or 
Loewentheil framework. 
 
II.  JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS 
 
There remains a larger question at issue about the nature of 
“religious exercise” for which legislatures and courts are granting 
exemptions, a question that Loewentheil has pointed out is “a 
neglected and under-theorized area in accommodation law, with 
no satisfactory framework yet advanced.”76 Although this general 
question has always been at the heart of the Court’s difficulty and 
inconsistency in evaluating free exercise claims, as well as claims 
under RFRA, no one has adequately grappled with the specific 
question of when something constitutes an “exercise” of religion. 
This inquiry—including an inquiry into the “substantiality” of a 
burden on religious exercise required under RFRA—if it is to be 
meaningful, requires that questions be asked about the nature of 
the religious practice at issue, about what has been termed the 
“centrality” of a practice to religious belief. The problem for the 
courts is that these inquiries are precluded by Establishment 
Clause principles. Without examining the nature of religious 
“exercise,” however, there can be no meaningful limitation on 
what can be claimed as religious exercise. Unless some other 
limitation on RFRA claims is adopted, such as the requirement 
that third party interests not be harmed, there will be no 
                                                          
burden” under the RFRA, but informing the government in writing of the 
same information and having the government inform the insurance companies 
was not. Of course, all this was done at the preliminary injunction stage and so 
“should not be construed as an expression of the Court’s views on the merits.” 
Id. 
76  Loewentheil, supra note 33, at 451 n.89. See also, e.g., Eisgruber & 
Sager, Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33. Cf. Edward Whelan, 
The HHS Contraception Mandate v. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2179, 2182 (2012) (claiming that “there can be no 
serious dispute that a person engages in an ‘exercise of religions . . . when, for 
religious reasons, he performs, or abstains from performing, certain 
actions’”). 
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limitation on what must be accommodated using the strict 
scrutiny test required by RFRA. This is exactly the Catch-22 the 
Court found itself in in Smith. 
 
A. Smith’s Catch-22 
 
The First Amendment’s free exercise doctrine has always 
struggled with questions about the nature of religious exercise 
that should be protected, with miserable results that tend to 
undermine the mandate for religious equality embodied in the 
Religion Clauses.77 The ultimate problem with application of 
strict scrutiny to free exercise claims, such as the ones in Smith, 
Conestoga Wood, and Hobby Lobby, is the difficulty of 
governing a society where a claim that a law interfered with one’s 
religious exercise mandates, almost automatically, that the person 
be granted an exemption from that law.78 By demanding the 
highest standard of review—requiring that governmental actions 
that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by 
a compelling governmental interest79—the strict scrutiny standard 
creates a presumption of invalidity for any regulation of conduct 
that is claimed to interfere with religious exercise.80 The Smith 
Court recognized that in the past it had applied the strict scrutiny 
standard—and thus the presumption of invalidity—inconsistently, 
striking down regulations in the face of complaints in very limited 
circumstances, without limiting the standard’s reach in the 
context of religion in any principled way. The reason it should be 
impossible to turn down a claim under strict scrutiny? Because of 
the First Amendment’s separate prohibition on judicial review of 
the “centrality” of conduct to an individual’s religion, the 
“relative merits of differing religious claims,” or “the 
determin[ation] of the place of a particular belief in a religion or 
                                                          
77 See Eisgruber & Sager, Why RFRA is Unconstitutional, supra note 33. 
78 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888.   
79 See id. at 883 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)). 
80 Id. at 888 (“We cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively 
invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that 
does not protect an interest of the highest order.” (emphasis in original)). 
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the plausibility of a religious claim.”81 As the Court notes in 
Smith: 
It is no more appropriate for judges to determine 
the “centrality” of religious beliefs before applying 
a “compelling interest” test in the free exercise 
field, than it would be for them to determine the 
“importance” of ideas before applying the 
“compelling interest” test in the free speech field.82  
In support of its position that courts must not examine the 
centrality of religious belief, the Court in Smith cites a string of 
cases grounding the prohibition against judicial scrutiny of 
centrality of religious belief in the First Amendment and, in one 
case, specifically in the Establishment Clause.83 The Court cites 
                                                          
81 Id. at 887, 886 (“Nor is it possible to limit the impact of respondents’ 
proposal by requiring a ‘compelling state interest’ only when the conduct 
prohibited is ‘central’ to the individual’s religion.”). 
82 Id. at 886–88. 
83 Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–88 (citing Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 
699 (1989)) (“It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of 
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ 
interpretations of those creeds. We do, however, have doubts whether the 
alleged burden imposed by the deduction disallowance on the Scientologists’ 
practices is a substantial one.”); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. 
Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715–16 (1981) (“One can, of course, imagine an asserted 
claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to 
protection under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here, and 
the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all 
of the members of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not 
within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the 
petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their 
common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”); 
Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (refusing to conduct inquiry “to determine 
matters at the very core of a religion—the interpretation of particular church 
doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion,” because 
“[p]lainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a 
role”); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (noting that “the First 
Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in 
resolving church property disputes . . . . Most importantly, the First 
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footnote number two of Justice Stevens’s concurrence in United 
States v. Lee in which Justice Stevens explained that the principal 
reason for avoiding this inquiry  
is the overriding interest in keeping the 
government—whether it be the legislature or the 
courts—out of the business of evaluating the 
relative merits of differing religious claims. The 
risk that governmental approval of some and 
disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring 
one religion over another is an important risk the 
Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.84 
Because the Establishment Clause precludes the Court from 
reviewing the validity of a claim of religious interference, if a 
compelling interest test was to be applied, it must be applied 
across the board, to all actions claimed to be religiously 
commanded. This is different, as the Court seemed to be 
admitting, from how the Court had applied the compelling 
interest test piecemeal, read discriminatorily, in the past. The 
Court then listed a number of important statutes, such as 
manslaughter and child-abuse statutes, from which exemptions 
could be sought. Importantly, the purpose of this list was not to 
suggest that the courts would necessarily grant exemptions from 
these eminently reasonable statutes, but to point out that denial of 
any of these exemptions would require denial of all exemptions. 
Any grant of one exemption but not another put the Court in 
violation of the Establishment Clause because it risked that the 
Court was itself comparing the weight of the burden on one 
person’s religious belief as against the weight of the burden on 
                                                          
Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on 
the basis of religious doctrine and practice”); United States v. Ballard, 322 
U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (“We do not agree that the truth or verity of respondents’ 
religious doctrines or beliefs should have been submitted to the jury. Whatever 
this particular indictment might require, the First Amendment precludes such a 
course, as the United States seems to concede. ‘The law knows no heresy, and 
is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect.’”).   
84  Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also Smith, 
494 U.S. at 887 (discussing the “unacceptable ‘business of evaluating the 
relative merits of differing religious claims’”). 
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another person’s religious belief, a comparison that required 
prohibited inquiry into the centrality of a practice under religious 
law.85  
Thus, the real problem that the Court faced in Smith is the 
impossibility of evaluating the extent of a burden on religious 
exercise without inquiring into the “centrality” of the religious 
belief being claimed.86 In Smith, Justice Scalia writing for the 
Court recognized the Catch-22 that this created. On the one hand, 
courts cannot inquire into centrality because of the risk of 
creating a widespread perception of favoritism that will lead to 
internecine conflicts between individuals of different faiths and 
faith traditions. On the other hand, “[d]ispensing with a 
‘centrality’ inquiry is utterly unworkable.”87 As Justice Scalia 
wrote for the Court: 
[i]t would require, . . . the same degree of 
“compelling state interest” to impede the practice 
of throwing rice at church weddings as to impede 
the practice of getting married in church. There is 
no way out of the difficulty that, if general laws 
are to be subjected to a “religious practice” 
exception, both the importance of the law at issue 
and the centrality of the practice at issue must 
reasonably be considered.”88 
As the Court in Smith recognized, if strict scrutiny is indeed 
to be applied, “it must be applied across the board, to all actions 
thought to be religiously commanded.”89 This is to say it must be 
applied consistently and fairly. But “if ‘compelling interest’ really 
                                                          
85 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888–89 (listing compulsory military service, 
payment of taxes, manslaughter and child neglect laws, compulsory 
vaccination laws, traffic laws, minimum wage legislation, child-labor and 
animal-cruelty laws, laws protecting the environment, and equality of 
opportunity for the races). 
86 Id. at 886–87.   
87 Id. at 887 n.4. 
88 Id. (emphasis in original).  
89 Id. at 888.   
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means what it says, . . . many laws will not meet the test.”90 In 
Smith, the Court was distressed at the prospect of applying a real 
strict scrutiny test91 that would require courts to grant 
accommodations from all sorts of “reasonable” laws, such as 
laws prohibiting drug use to laws prohibiting murder and 
mayhem, all in the service of religious belief. In the face of this 
crisis, the Court throws up its hands and passes the buck to the 
legislature. Categorically unable to adjudicate such claims in a 
manner that does not create the appearance of establishing some 
religions as favored and some as disfavored, the Court in Smith 
concluded it was proscribed from deciding whose claims to 
individual religious exemptions were valid and whose were 
invalid under the Free Exercise Clause by independent 
counterforce embodied in the Establishment Clause.92 
The Justices struggle with their inability to review religious 
practice to determine the scope of Free Exercise claims 
throughout the opinions in Smith. However, while swearing off 
such inquiries in writing, in practice the Courts have been unable 
to resist making these determinations in Free Exercise cases. For 
example, Justice O’Connor in her concurrence repeats the 
Court’s constant refrain that “it is not within the judicial ken to 
question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a 
faith,”93 and states that the determination of the constitutionality 
                                                          
90 Id.   
91 Id. (noting that because “we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of 
people of almost every conceivable religious preference,” the compelling 
interest standard would require exemptions “from civic obligations of every 
conceivable kind” (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961))). 
92  This is not a wholly unusual situation in Constitutional law. The Court 
has held that the Constitution’s commitment to equality means that race-
conscious measures to remedy racially-disparate impacts must also be narrowly 
circumscribed to avoid embroiling courts in a process of enacting the very 
inequality they seek to remedy. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
Courts are limited in their powers to enjoin and limit speech to protect the 
privacy of individuals in legal proceedings lest they themselves violate the 
First Amendment, even though privacy is generally regarded as itself protected 
by the First Amendment at least to some extent. 
93  Smith, 494 U.S. at 906 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal 
2014.05.06 SMITH.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:26 AM 
754 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
of the ban on peyote use “cannot, and should not, turn on the 
centrality of the particular religious practice at issue.”94 On the 
other hand, Justice O’Connor proposes, 
the sounder approach—the approach more 
consistent with our role as judges to decide each 
case on its individual merits—is to apply [the 
compelling state interest test] in each case to 
determine whether the burden on the specific 
plaintiffs before us is constitutionally significant 
and whether the particular criminal interest 
asserted by the State before us is compelling.95 
Justice O’Connor would allow the courts to make factual 
findings “as to whether a claimant holds a sincerely held religious 
belief that conflicts with, and thus is burdened by, the challenged 
law.”96 Admitting that “[t]he distinction between the question of 
centrality and questions of sincerity and burden” is “fine,” Justice 
O’Connor nonetheless insists that “it is one that is an established 
part of our Free Exercise doctrine, and one that courts are 
capable of making.”97 She then determines that the prohibition of 
peyote places a severe burden on the respondents’ religious 
practice, and that the state has a compelling interest in controlling 
use of illegal drugs.98 Finally, while claiming she is not 
questioning the centrality of the peyote use to the church, Justice 
O’Connor appears to do just that, questioning whether the 
claimant holds a “sincerely held religious belief that conflicts 
with, and thus is burdened by, the challenged law.”99 
Justice Blackmun writing in dissent similarly demonstrates the 
problem with review of the sincerity of religious belief or the 
                                                          
Revenue., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
94 Id. at 906–07.   
95 Id. at 899.   
96 Id. at 907.   
97 Id. (citing Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 
290, 303–05 (1985); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85–88 (1944)).  
98 Id. at 903–04 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing scholarly work on 
Peyote Religion). 
99 Id. at 907.   
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centrality of a belief to religious practice. Justice Blackmun, like 
Justice O’Connor, applied strict scrutiny, but weighed the 
importance of the peyote ritual differently than Justice O’Connor 
and so would have granted an exemption from the peyote ban.100 
Like the other Justices, Blackmun begins by agreeing that “courts 
should refrain from delving into questions whether, as a matter of 
religious doctrine, a particular practice is ‘central’ to the 
religion.”101 He goes on, though, to advocate that courts do just 
that, citing to Yoder’s determination that “education is 
inseparable from and a part of the basic tenets of the [Amish] 
religion . . . [, just as] baptism, the confessional, or a Sabbath 
may be for others,” noting “I do not think this means that the 
courts must turn a blind eye to the severe impact of a State’s 
restrictions on the adherents of a minority religion.”102 He then 
finds that “[w]ithout peyote, [the Respondents] could not enact 
the essential ritual of their religion.”103  
Justice Scalia writing for the Court explicitly rejects the 
approaches of both Justice O’Connor and Justice Blackman. In 
response to Justice O’Connor, he dismisses the “fine” distinction 
between judicial review of the centrality of religious belief and 
review of the “significance” of a burden, noting that 
“‘[c]onstitutionally significant burden’ would seem to be 
‘centrality’ under another name.”104 To Justice Blackmun he 
similarly replies that there is no difference between inquiry into 
“severe impact” and inquiry into “centrality” of a religious belief 
and notes that Blackmun’s evaluation of the impact of the peyote 
ban demonstrates this fact. Justice Scalia declares that Justice 
Blackmun “has merely substituted for the question ‘How 
                                                          
100 Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).   
101 Id. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 919–20 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing a brief filed by the 
Association on American Indian Affairs et al., a scholarly history of the peyote 
religion, and a popular mystery novel by Tony Hillerman, describing ritual in 
which the “sacrament Peyote is the means for communicating with the Great 
Spirit”). 
104 Id. at 887 n.4 (majority opinion).   
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important is X to the religious adherent?’ the question ‘How great 
will be the harm to the religious adherent if X is taken away?’ 
There is no material difference.”105  
It is into Smith’s breach that Congress—emboldened by 
support from left, right, and middle—inserted RFRA, leaving the 
Court in the untenable position of reviewing the “substantiality” 
of the burden on “religious exercise,” the inquiry the Court 
rejected in Smith as precluded by the Establishment Clause.106 
Under RFRA, Congress demands the “horrible” result the Court 
decried in Smith, mandating that “federal judges will regularly 
balance against the importance of general laws the significance of 
religious practice.”107 
 
B. Breadth of the Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood Claims 
 
One could argue that there are cases that would not require 
the Court to evaluate the significance of certain behaviors and 
their importance to religious practice in a way that implicates the 
concerns articulated in Smith. For example, challenges to laws 
that so obviously burden clear and well-established rules of a 
given religion, such as a law that prevents a person from 
becoming a minister to her chosen congregation, a law that 
prevents a person from using the sacramental wine, a law that 
prevents a person from using peyote in a religious ceremony, 
these might not test the court or require it to evaluate religious 
doctrine in a threatening way. These all seem obviously 
burdensome in a substantial way, even though the last was not 
                                                          
105 Id.   
106 It could be argued that “substantiality” of a burden is a different 
inquiry than “centrality” of a burdened religious belief, but determining the 
extent of a burden requires an interpretation of the importance of a burdened 
practice to one’s overall religious life.  This sort of judicial review of doctrine 
creates the risk of an appearance of impartiality with which the Smith Court 
was concerned.   
107 Smith, 494 U.S. at 889 n.5. See Levine, supra note 9, at 122–23 
(noting that RFRA’s substantial burden test “appear[s] to require courts to 
engage in the kind of investigation into religious beliefs that Supreme Court 
Justices have increasingly and nearly uniformly rejected”). 
2014.05.06 SMITH.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:26 AM 
 WHO DECIDES CONSCIENCE? RFRA’S CATCH-22 757 
 
obvious to the Court in Smith. One could argue that because these 
laws directly contradict central aspects of the actual ceremonial 
“celebration” of religion, the courts can avoid the Catch-22 
because they need not enter into a prohibited area of review to 
hold that these laws violate RFRA.   
But in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood the claims are 
more complicated.  These plaintiffs are not claiming that how 
they celebrate their religion is burdened. Rather, they claim that 
by offering plans that include the means to obtain contraception, 
they are somehow complicit in what they see as the sin of the 
person who chooses to use contraception, even if the person who 
uses the contraception does not see it as a sin, and indeed, even if 
the person who uses contraception sees it as religiously mandated. 
They argue that their “religious exercise” will be “substantially 
burden[ed]” under RFRA if the insurance plans provided to their 
employees include contraceptives as part of a package of 
preventive services, even if the employer does not pay anything 
for the contraception, and even though the employee’s choice to 
use or not use contraception stands between the employer and the 
employee’s alleged “sin.” Furthermore, they claim this chain of 
causation between sin and employer is not broken in this 
circumstance, but that it is broken where the employee uses other 
financial benefits they receive from their employers, i.e., salary, 
to pay for contraception. Moreover, the plaintiffs in Hobby 
Lobby make this claim even though the health insurance plans 
they offered before the ACA required contraceptives to be 
covered, covered contraception. Hobby Lobby only dropped 
coverage for contraceptives when federal law required coverage, 
a fact that should lead the Court to question the substantiality of 
the burden imposed.108 The breadth of these claims puts the Court 
squarely in forbidden waters. 
This Catch-22 came to a head recently in the oral argument 
and subsequent decision in Notre Dame v. Sebelius, a case which 
involves the more “fantastic” claim that even requiring Notre 
                                                          
108 See Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(questioning sincerity of the plaintiff’s claimed religious belief); see also infra 
note 124. 
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Dame to invoke the statutory exemption granted under ACA from 
the contraception coverage requirements violates RFRA.109 As 
Notre Dame’s counsel stated, if Notre Dame believes it is a 
substantial burden on its religious exercise to even apply for the 
accommodation, the court must grant an accommodation from 
applying for the accommodation, no questions asked: “It is up to 
the believer to draw the line.”110  
                                                          
109 Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 13-3853, slip op. at 20 (7th 
Cir. Feb. 21, 2014) (“What makes this case and others like it involving the 
contraception exemption paradoxical and virtually unprecedented is that the 
beneficiaries of the religious exemption are claiming that the exemption 
process itself imposes a substantial burden on their religious faiths.”). 
110 See, e.g., Notre Dame Oral Argument 27:23, supra note 13. The full 
colloquy went as follows: 
Judge Hamilton:  We have a long history in this country of 
accommodating religious faith in various ways that are not 
required by free exercise or prohibited by the Establishment 
Clause, there’s some play in the joints, we know . . . . Can 
you point me to any other example in our legal history where 
the accommodation itself has been challenged as a burden on 
free exercise? 
Mr. Kairys: You mean other accommodations?  This 
mandate is new. 
Judge Hamilton:  This mandate is new, yes, I’m trying to 
understand though . . . . 
Mr. Kairys:  I cannot your honor . . . . 
Judge Hamilton: [h]ow complying with minimal . . . I mean, 
to provide an accommodation at all requires at least some 
minimal invocation, say “yes I want to take advantage of the 
accommodation.” 
Mr. Kairys:  Right, but it is up to the believer to draw that 
line. And Notre Dame has made that religious determination 
and Korte says it is not for you to engage in this issue of 
minimal or not minimal. 
Judge Hamilton:  It sounds like what you are telling us is that 
the entire U.S. Code then is subject to strict scrutiny any 
time somebody raises a sincere religious objection. 
Id.; see also id. at 18:50 (where counsel for Notre Dame argues that under 
RFRA, “It is not for the Court to determine what is ‘meaningful’ or what’s 
‘insignificant.’  [Notre Dame has] made their own religious determination that 
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The Notre Dame panel rejected this position, holding that the 
burden of invoking a statutory exemption was minimal, and that 
though “Notre Dame may consider the process a substantial 
burden, but substantiality—like compelling governmental 
interest—is for the court to decide.”111  Notably, though, the 
court escaped the Catch-22 because the minimal nature of the 
burden claimed made the claim practically ridiculous in its eyes. 
The court distinguished a different Seventh Circuit case, Korte v. 
Sebelius,112 in which the panel had an opposite reaction to the 
RFRA Catch-22,113 taking the hands-off approach in the more 
difficult case of two individual owners of a for-profit business 
that was not entitled to the statutory exemption, and who, like the 
plaintiffs in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga, sought an 
accommodation under RFRA. In Korte,114 the panel upheld the 
plaintiffs’ RFRA claims, and contradicting the Smith Court’s 
determination, wrote: 
[i]mportantly, the substantial-burden inquiry does 
not invite the court to determine the centrality of 
the religious practice to the adherent’s faith; RFRA 
is explicit about that. And free-exercise doctrine 
makes it clear that the test for substantial burden 
does not ask whether the claimant has correctly 
interpreted his religious obligations. Indeed, that 
inquiry is prohibited . . . . It is enough that the 
                                                          
the role required of it from signing the form to maintaining a contractual 
relationship [violates its religious tenets.]”). 
111 Notre Dame, No. 13-3853, slip op. at 21. The Court held that the 
paperwork burden is “the opposite of cumbersome,” id. at 13, and while 
expressing skepticism of the second burden, the “triggering” burden, by 
writing “[t]hat seems a fantastic suggestion,” id. at 18, the court ultimately 
finds it unconvincing as a factual matter, id. at 15 (“Notre Dame’s signing the 
form no more ‘triggers’ Meritain’s obligation to provide contraceptive services 
than a tortfeasor’s declaring bankruptcy ‘triggers’ his co-tortfeasors’ joint and 
several liability for damages.”). 
112 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013). 
113 Notre Dame, No. 13-3853, slip op. at 21 (distinguishing Korte, 735 
F.3d at 654). 
114 Korte, 735 F.3d at 654. 
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claimant has an “honest conviction” that what the 
government is requiring, prohibiting, or pressuring 
him to do conflicts with his religion.115 
The Korte panel attempted to draw a distinction between 
“sincerity” and “religiosity,” both factual inquiries it claimed are 
within the court’s authority and competence, and the “substantial-
burden” inquiry which the panel argues, along with the Tenth 
Circuit, is “primarily” an evaluation of the “intensity of the 
coercion applied by the government to act contrary to [religious] 
beliefs.”116 By defining the substantial burden inquiry as an 
evaluation of the “coercive effect of the governmental pressure on 
the adherent’s religious practice,” as the adherent defines the 
religious practice, Korte intends to steer the substantial burden 
inquiry “well clear of deciding religious questions.”117 While the 
Notre Dame panel declined to state its disagreement with the 
Korte panel on this view of the substantial burden inquiry 
explicitly, if the “coercive effect” of the government pressure 
were the only issue, the result would have been the same in both 
cases, because the penalty for failure to comply is the same. 
Instead, in Notre Dame, the panel refuses to abdicate its role of 
reviewing substantial burden, but it still appears to leave open the 
possibility that abdication of judicial review of the burden must 
occur where the question is harder.118 If the hands-off view of 
judicial review of burden prevails under Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Wood, as it did in Korte, the courts’ role under RFRA 
will simply be to decide whether the plaintiffs are forced to do 
something they claim violates their religious beliefs, something 
they oppose other people doing because it contrasts with their 
moral beliefs as religious people. The courts will not be 
conducting a meaningful review of whether or not the action 
burdens, in any significant way, their exercise of religion. As 
Judge Hamilton warns during oral argument in Notre Dame, “It 
                                                          
115 Id. at 683 (citations omitted). 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Notre Dame, No. 13-3853, slip op. at 21 (distinguishing Korte, 735 
F.3d at 654). 
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sounds like what you are telling us is that the entire U.S. Code 
then is subject to strict scrutiny any time somebody raises a 
sincere religious objection.”119 
 
III.  AVOIDING THE CATCH-22 
 
The Court recently heard argument in Hobby Lobby and 
Conestoga Wood and may issue decisions before this essay goes 
to print. I conclude here by discussing three possible outcomes of 
these cases. 
 
A.  Limiting RFRA 
 
There are two ways the Court in Hobby Lobby and Conestoga 
Wood could limit RFRA to avoid the Catch-22 altogether. First, 
the Court could recognize that accommodations may not be 
granted in these cases, because the harm to third parties is too 
great, under either the Gedicks/Van Tassell or the Loewentheil 
theory.120 If the Court adopts this approach, it will not be called 
upon to address the substantiality of the burden on religious 
exercise under RFRA. Second, the Court could interpret 
“religious exercise” under RFRA strictly to mean only those 
actions that constitute religious “practice.” Limiting “religious 
exercise” to actions such as, for example, celebrating religion or 
wearing religious garb identifying one’s religious affiliation, 
would allow the Court to avoid the issue in this case because the 
attenuated claims of harm here would not qualify as this type of 
religious exercise.121   
 
                                                          
119 Notre Dame Oral Argument at 27:23, supra note 13. 
120 See supra notes 66–75 and accompanying text. 
121 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 
132 S.Ct. 694, 711–12 (2012) (“The First Amendment protects the freedom of 
religious groups to engage in certain key religious activities, including the 
conducting of worship services and other religious ceremonies and rituals, as 
well as the critical process of communicating the faith.”) (Alito and Kagan, 
JJ., concurring). 
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B. Choosing “All” or Choosing “Some” 
 
If the Court does consider the merits of the claims here, it 
strays into the area of considering claims for exemptions from 
secular mandates because the mandates prevent someone from 
living one’s life “in accordance with one’s religious belief.” 
Consideration of such claims leads the Court into the dangerous 
waters between Scylla and Charybdis. Either the Court will 
choose “all,” accepting at face value any claim that a secular rule 
conflicts with a religious belief, or it will choose “some,” and 
evaluate whether being tangentially involved in giving a third 
party the freedom to act or not act in a way that would conflict 
with one’s own religious belief is itself in violation of the 
plaintiff’s religious belief.  
The Court could agree with the Korte panel and the position 
of the University of Notre Dame and hold that it is the believer 
who draws the line. It may be that the Court will distinguish 
RFRA’s requirement that the Court conduct a review of the 
substantiality of a burden and the same inquiry conducted under 
the Free Exercise Clause, based on the former being a 
legislatively mandated review while the latter was a judicially 
created standard. The Court could then conduct a perfunctory 
review of “substantial burden,” applying a very limited inquiry 
into the burden the attenuated claims place on the plaintiffs in 
these cases. It is also possible that the Court will hold that the 
connection here between government action and religious exercise 
is simply too attenuated to amount to a substantial burden on 
religious exercise. 
In any case, application of RFRA’s standard to allow for-
profit businesses an exemption from the ACA contraceptive 
coverage requirement, like application of the strict scrutiny 
standard to free exercise claims under the Constitution, would, as 
the Court warned in Smith: 
open the prospect of constitutionally required 
religious exemptions from civic obligations of 
almost every conceivable kind—ranging from 
compulsory military service, . . . to the payment 
2014.05.06 SMITH.DOCX 5/19/2014  11:26 AM 
 WHO DECIDES CONSCIENCE? RFRA’S CATCH-22 763 
 
of taxes . . . to health and safety regulation such as 
manslaughter and child neglect laws, . . . 
compulsory vaccination laws, . . . , drug 
laws, . . ., and traffic laws . . .; to social welfare 
legislation such as minimum wage laws, . . . , 
child labor laws, . . . , animal cruelty laws, . . . 
environmental protection laws, . . . and laws 
providing for equality of opportunity for the 
races, . . . .122  
Given that many think the Court will grant the exemptions in 
this case, we should prepare ourselves to use RFRA to enforce 
equal protection for our own religious freedom, and to challenge 
restrictions on actions mandated by our consciences in our 
relationships with our own “divinities.” Courts have rejected the 
claims of the Church of Marijuana,123 but the claims of many 
religious people, for example, religious people who were 
integrally involved in the movement for reproductive freedoms in 
the 1960s and 1970s will not be so easily sloughed off. 
Moreover, if the Court grants the exemptions in these cases, any 
attempt to deny claims brought under RFRA by those whose 
religious beliefs lead them to choose abortions or contraceptives, 
or those whose religious beliefs mandate they make abortions or 
contraceptives available to others, would be an unconstitutional 
application of RFRA under the Establishment Clause. We await 




I am not optimistic that the Court will follow these 
suggestions. In defending the contraceptive coverage 
requirements, the federal government has been extremely reticent 
to criticize RFRA from what I imagine is a political desire to 
avoid seeming hostile to any religious claims. They have 
                                                          
122  Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990) (citations omitted). 
123 United States v. Meyers, 95 F.3d 1475, 1484 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(denying RFRA claim of adherent of the Church of Marijuana as espousing a 
philosophy and/or way of life rather than a “religion”). 
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studiously avoided questioning the sincerity of religious beliefs 
and tried to avoid anything that would entangle the Court in 
questioning the claimed burdens on religious exercise. The 
government has done this despite ample evidence in this and other 
challenges to the contraceptive mandates that these claims are 
being made only as part of a broader objection to federal power, 
and/or as an effort to prevent women from accessing 
contraception.124 Nor has anyone questioned Catholic plaintiffs’ 
                                                          
124 In its recent decision in Eden Foods, Inc. v. Sebelius, 733 F.3d 626 
(8th Cir. 2013), the Eighth Circuit questioned the sincerity of the plaintiff’s 
claimed religious belief. The court notes that the plaintiff Michael Potter, a 
Roman Catholic, claims that he 
follows the teachings of the Catholic Church, and has 
“deeply held religious beliefs” “that prevent him from 
participating in, paying for, training others to engage in, or 
otherwise supporting contraception, abortion, and 
abortifacients.” In fact, Potter claims that “these procedures 
almost always involve immoral and unnatural practices.”  
Id. at 629. The court then notes in a footnote: 
Interestingly, in a conversation with salon.com’s Irin 
Carmon, Potter’s “deeply held religious beliefs,” more 
resembled a laissez-faire, anti-government screed. Potter 
stated to Carmon, “I’ve got more interest in good quality 
long underwear than I have in birth control pills.” Carmon 
then asked the Eden Foods chairman why he didn’t seem to 
care about birth control when he had taken the step to file a 
lawsuit over the contraceptive mandate. Potter responded, 
“Because I’m a man, number one[,] and it’s really none of 
my business what women do.” The article continued: So, 
then, why bother suing? “Because I don’t care if the federal 
government is telling me to buy my employees Jack Daniel’s 
or birth control. What gives them the right to tell me that I 
have to do that? That’s my issue, that’s what I object to, and 
that’s the beginning and end of the story.” He added, “I’m 
not trying to get birth control out of Rite Aid or Wal-Mart, 
but don’t tell me I gotta pay for it.” 
Id. at 629 n.3 (citation omitted). Similarly, in the Hobby Lobby case, the 
plaintiff’s “religious exercise” only became “substantially burdened” when the 
federal government adopted the contraceptive coverage requirement. See, e.g., 
Jaime Fuller, Here’s What You Need to Know About the Hobby Lobby Case, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-
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objections to providing access to all contraceptions despite the 
approval by the Catholic Church of these medications when used 
therapeutically, not as a form of contraceptive.125 In fact, unless 
the Court follows the path recommended by Gedicks and Van 
Tassell or Loewentheil in implementing an alternative limitation 
on the grant of accommodations under RFRA, I suspect that the 
Court will grant an accommodation in the contraception cases, 
while refusing accommodations in future cases to those whose 
religions are less palatable to them,126 like mine.127 This will 
                                                          
fix/wp/2014/03/24/heres-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-hobby-lobby-case/. 
Until that point, the health plans offered contraceptive coverage without 
objection from the plaintiffs.   
125 The Humanae Vitae, the document setting out the Roman Catholic 
Church’s position on contraception, permits therapeutic uses of contraceptives 
to treat organic diseases, even though they have a contraceptive effect.  PAUL 
VI, HUMANAE VITAE (1968), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/ 
paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html 
(“On the other hand, the Church does not consider at all illicit the use of those 
therapeutic means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable 
impediment to procreation should result there from—provided such 
impediment is not directly intended for any motive whatsoever.”). 
126 See, e.g., Meyers, 95 F.3d at 1484 (denying RFRA claim of adherent 
of the Church of Marijuana as espousing a philosophy and/or way of life rather 
than a “religion.”). 
127 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (“Men and 
women of good conscience can disagree, and we suppose some always shall 
disagree, about the profound moral and spiritual implications of terminating a 
pregnancy, even in its earliest stage); id. at 916 (“[a]s the joint opinion so 
eloquently demonstrates, a woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy is 
nothing less than a matter of conscience”) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); see also, e.g., Lawrence B. Finer, et al., Reasons U.S. 
Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL & REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH 110 (2005); Rachel K. 
Jones et al., “I Would Want to Give My Child, Like, Everything in the 
World”: How Issues of Motherhood Influence Women Who Have Abortions, 
29 J. OF FAMILY ISSUES 79, 86 (2008); Rachel K. Jones & Lawrence B. Finer, 
Who has Second-Trimester Abortions in the United States? 85 
CONTRACEPTION 544 (2012); Priscilla J. Smith, Responsibility for Life: How 
Abortion Services Women’s Interests in Motherhood, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 97 
(2008) (exploring the ways women's respect for the importance of motherhood 
and “bonds of love” with their children sometimes inform their decisions to 
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produce exactly the Establishment Clause violation the Court 
rejected in Smith and Justice Stevens warned against in Lee. If 
this is the route the Court takes, it should expect that its religious 
neutrality will be tested, and the religious underpinnings of civil 
rights movements will rise again.  
 
                                                          
obtain abortions); Phoebe Day Danziger, A Peaceful Death:  Aborting My Son 
Was Not About When Life Begins, But How to End it Humanely, SLATE (Feb. 
5, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/02/abortion_ 
as_end_of_life_care_why_i_chose_a_peaceful_life_and_death_for_my.html. 
